By Bradley Yeh

(Click Here To Read Part 1 & 2.)

With Glen Kelly defeated Paul Briggs knew domestic superiority within the Australian light heavyweight boxing circuit would now be publicly acknowledged as his. And it was. As Briggs rode the wave created from his destruction of Tosca Petridis, several years previous, it was if he simply dropped in on Kelly, and in no uncertain terms said, “one of us has to go”. Kelly departed.

After two more domestic assignments, both completed within allocated timeframes, (Briggs KO’d both Anthony Bigeni & Brad Mc Neil, in the 1st round), Briggs then moved on to fight an opponent that was described as one of the more experienced and dangerous pugilistic operators at the time; Jorge Castro.

Castro had a tremendous record going into the Briggs fight; 132 fights for 122 wins, 85 wins via KO, Only 8 losses and 2 draws. At 36 Castro was considered by some to be on the far side of his career, but nonetheless he was still widely regarded as a strong and clever gatekeeper to light heavyweight’s upper contention rankings. Any misconceptions that Castro was cooked could easily be put aside by the fact that the year prior to meeting Briggs, Castro fought both, Vassiliy Jirov and Etienne Whitaker. Both those fights with Castro went the distance and were decided by the cards, with Castro losing to Jirov and winning against Whitaker. In addition, Castro also managed to KO another opponent in the same year of 2000. Nice work if you can get it.

Considering that Jirov had extended James Toney all the way in his very next fight after Castro; the year 2000 was a lively one for Castro. Viewed from that perspective perhaps a modicum of honour can be extracted for Castro when considering his loss to Jirov.

All up Castro was a danger man for those uninitiated at world-class level and his skills and experience meant he was precisely what was required for Briggs to demonstrate beyond doubt that he was initiated at the world-class level.

Within the 15 months prior to the Castro fight, Briggs himself also was very active. During that time Briggs had 6 fights, for which he won all by the short route. The statistics from that 6 fight activity period are frightening; Briggs fought only 27% out of the 66 rounds assigned and no one made it past 4 rounds. With only 18 rounds performed within almost a year and a half, to Briggs Castro appeared more than capable of quantifying his true ability on the world scene. For all intensive purposes, going into the Briggs V Castro fight it appeared as if the seasoned practitioner in Castro could extend Briggs the full distance – a circumstance that wasn’t common.

At the Carrara Sports Complex, in Queensland, Australia, April 2003, Briggs applied his craft and defeated Castro by unanimously outpointing him. The fight provided the intended experience required for Briggs to evaluate his performance during distanced events and make the necessary adjustments and improve.

The success also threw Briggs right into the mix of professional boxing, globally. Exactly where he wanted to be.

After another 5 round rampage (Juan Zabala TKO 5), Briggs lined up to see who was the better man with Jesus Ruiz. At the time Ruiz had almost a 90% win ratio by some form of KO. Ruiz had enjoyed mixed success with hardened boxers. But there was more to the Ruiz story than that revealed by a glance at the surface Going into the fight with Briggs Ruiz’s most credible previous opponents were most probably Julio Gonzales, Montell Griffin & Rodney Toney, all in that order, all which Ruiz had lost to one after the other in different ways. Gonzalez beat Ruiz by TKO in round 9 when they met, Griffin had beaten Ruiz by way of a technical KO that resulted from an accidental headbutt, and Rodney Toney had won his fight against Ruiz via a unanimous decision.

Breaking it down; Gonzalez went on to prove himself to be a very strong and durable candidate who currently has a 43 fight record for 40 wins, 24 KO’s & 3 losses – so someone was always going to get knocked out in that fight and unfortunately it was Ruiz. Montell Griffin was by far Ruiz’ most dangerous and experienced opponent who was, 40 fights, 3 losses, and 0 draws going in with Ruiz. Viewed objectively, the loss against Montell Griffin that Ruiz suffered from an accidental headbutt may have weighed heavily against Ruiz’s danger index going into the fight with Briggs, as the Griffin was already ahead on points at the time of the stoppage, which took place in the final round. And as for the Rodney Toney loss, objectively that appears to be a loss with much of its result attributed to Ruiz’s previous two fights with Gonzalez and Griffin, as it is hard to imagine Jones troubling Rioz had they met a few years prior.

Losses to guys like Gonzalez and Griffin whilst worthy of consideration when assessing competition, bring no shame to a career. It was still evident that Ruiz could operate within the upper contention ranks and with a KO percentage approaching 90% Briggs couldn’t afford to make a mistake as there was no doubt Ruiz could also punch.

When Briggs and Ruiz met for the WBC light heavyweight world title eliminator in, Penrith, NSW, Australia, things really started to heat up. In round 2 Briggs went down after Ruiz landed clean and hard.

Aside from successfully coming back after a devastating loss, how and if a fighter can turn a fight around, whilst it is in play, precisely indicates what he is truly capable of. Kostya Tzsyu did it with Hector Lopez and Jeff Harding redefined the strategy with Dennis Andries in an incredibly violent light heavyweight encounter. The measure of everyone’s belief in Paul Briggs to do exactly the same revealed itself in just how unsurprised spectators were when Briggs did it against Ruiz at the Panthers Club in NSW, March 2004. The Australian boxing fraternity had not forgotten the determination of Jeff Harding, their last light heavyweight hero, and now, 10 years later, Paul Briggs was the light heavyweight vehicle through which they could all express their pugilistic pride.

And turn the fight around is exactly what Briggs did. With the determination of a hurricane Paul Briggs rose from the canvass during the 2nd round aberration against Jesus Ruiz and moved the fight into deep waters extending the action out to the 12th round to defeat Ruiz by a painful majority decision. In that fight Briggs, chopped, crunched, smashed and systematically pounded through Ruiz to such a debilitating extent that during the intense exchanges some ringsiders were unsteady enough with their thoughts that they could be seen nervously glancing sideways with left and right sharp eye movements - always careful to give the appearance of looking forward.

By not turning their head, a spectator’s need to publicly confirm they're taken aback (and perhaps seen as uninitiated), is neatly concealed, as the inner psyche yields to the emotion’s request to censure thoughts by closing down movements that illuminate the edge of rational perception has been approached. When executed correctly an invitation to share an expression concern is then only accepted by those experiencing and exhibiting the same. Pride is therefore preserved and the fear of appearing inexperienced with one of boxings most brutal currencies has then conveniently served.

Under such circumstances the opportunity to confirm alarm is only then betrayed by the eyes, as was the case as Briggs viciously pounded into Ruiz.

Such concealment mechanisms also work inside the ring, for a fighter must never outwardly show that he his hurt, but he must always be able to detect when his competitor is concealing it. At the extremities, this can lead to an excess of punishment beyond what is necessary to prove superiority. It goes without saying that if someone is hurt and they don’t appear discomforted, then there is no sporting reason to stop inflicting pain. In other instances, without knowledge of this mechanism a fighter’s sense of pace can be inhibited, as he may not know when the time is right to pull the trigger on the big guns and finish.

Against Ruiz, Briggs had succeeded in surprising the audience, but not by turning the fight around. That was already expected, should the need for it occur. No, Briggs shocked by presenting his version of brutal boxing. And it was the apparent difference between what Briggs’ clearly believed was acceptable punishment to impose on Ruiz, in terms of amount and intensity - to that which others ringside may have expected, that gave rise to the alarm and the need to conceal.

It was easy for the Australians that remembered Jeff Harding to allow their patriotism to transcend towards Briggs, as Briggs has a significant portion of his strengths in common with Harding - the most easily observed being; Briggs is as unrelenting in his attack as it is efficient. He simply will not say die and he possesses an almost insurmountable pain threshold, which affords him excellent punch resistance. Briggs, like Harding, relishes the opportunity to trade and impose his will.

And that makes for a great fight.

Sometimes you can learn a lot about people by watching what they conceal as opposed to reveal. Boxing is no different. And particularly when the competitor’s physical breaking point is greater than the observer can visually accommodate. Between rounds 7 and 10 Briggs fought and punched Ruiz with the ferocity of a rampaging bushfire that had just burnt its way into a fuel refinery stockyard on the back of a Hurricane.

Think Julian Jackson V Terry Norris, or Mike Tyson V Pinklon Thomas, then prolong it for 12 rounds. That’s how Briggs looked against Ruiz.

Between the rounds the look on Ruiz’s face was that of a solo fire fighter holding a cup of water for an extinguisher. “Surely there's a better way to earn money”.

Colours spin and wheels grind; after facing Paul Briggs, Jesus Ruiz never fought again.

(This weekend Paul Briggs fights Thomasz Adamek for the WBC light heavyweight title. The 4th part of this series, to be released tomorrow, will cover to Brigg’s first fight with Adamek in 2005. Briggs V1 Adamek was one of the best fights in 2005).

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